and the circle of tall, watchful Utopians about them and

time:2023-11-30 13:10:52 source:Bump your head and knock your brain author:ability

CHAPTER XXXII The End of All the Law 121. All the divine precepts are, therefore, referred back to _love_, of which the apostle says, "Now the end of the commandment is love, out of a pure heart, and a good conscience and a faith unfeigned."[259] Thus every commandment harks back to love. For whatever one does either in fear of punishment or from some carnal impulse, so that it does not measure up to the standard of love which the Holy Spirit sheds abroad in our hearts -- whatever it is, it is not yet done as it should be, although it may seem to be. Love, in this context, of course includes both the love of God and the love of our neighbor and, indeed, "on these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets"[260] -- and, we may add, the gospel and the apostles, for from nowhere else comes the voice, "The end of the commandment is love,"[261] and, "God is love."[262] Therefore, whatsoever things God commands (and one of these is, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"[263]) and whatsoever things are not positively ordered but are strongly advised as good spiritual counsel (and one of these is, "It is a good thing for a man not to touch a woman"[264]) -- all of these imperatives are rightly obeyed only when they are measured by the standard of our love of God and our love of our neighbor in God [propter Deum]. This applies both in the present age and in the world to come. Now we love God in faith; then, at sight. For, though mortal men ourselves, we do not know the hearts of mortal men. But then "the Lord will illuminate the hidden things in the darkness and will make manifest the cogitations of the heart; and then shall each one have his praise from God"[265] -- for what will be praised and loved in a neighbor by his neighbor is just that which, lest it remain hidden, God himself will bring to light. Moreover, passion decreases as love increases[266] until love comes at last to that fullness which cannot be surpassed, "for greater love than this no one has, that a man lay down his life for his friends."[267] Who, then, can explain how great the power of love will be, when there will be no passion [cupiditas] for it to restrain or overcome? For, then, the supreme state of true health [summa sanitas] will have been reached, when the struggle with death shall be no more.

and the circle of tall, watchful Utopians about them and

CHAPTER XXXIII Conclusion 122. But somewhere this book must have an end. You can see for yourself whether you should call it an Enchiridion, or use it as one. But since I have judged that your zeal in Christ ought not to be spurned and since I believe and hope for good things for you through the help of our Redeemer, and since I love you greatly as one of the members of his body, I have written this book for you -- may its usefulness match its prolixity! -- on Faith, Hope, and Love.

and the circle of tall, watchful Utopians about them and

[1] 1 Cor. 1:20. [2] Wis. 6:26 (Vulgate). [3] Rom. 16:19. [4] A later interpolation, not found in the best MSS., adds, "As no one can exist from himself, so also no one can be wise in himself save only as he is enlightened by Him of whom it is written, 'All wisdom is from God' [Ecclus. 1:1]." [5] Job 28:28. [6] A transliteration of the Greek, literally, a handbook or manual. [7] Cf. Gal. 5:6. [8] Cf. 1 Cor. 13:10, 11. [9] 1 Cor. 3:11. [10] Already, very early in his ministry (397), Augustine had written De agone Christiano, in which he had reviewed and refuted a full score of heresies threatening the orthodox faith. [11] The Apostles' Creed. Cf. Augustine's early essay On Faith and the Creed. [12] Joel 2:32. [13] Rom. 10:14. [14] Lucan, Pharsalia, II, 15. [15] Virgil, Aeneid, IV, 419. The context of this quotation is Dido's lament over Aeneas' prospective abandonment of her. She is saying that if she could have foreseen such a disaster, she would have been able to bear it. Augustine's criticism here is a literalistic quibble. [16] Heb. 11:1. [17] Sacra eloquia -- a favorite phrase of Augustine's for the Bible. [18] Rom. 8:24, 25 (Old Latin). [19] James 2:19. [20] One of the standard titles of early Greek philosophical treatises would translate into Latin as De rerum natura. This is, in fact, the title of Lucretius' famous poem, the greatest philosophical work written in classical Latin. [21] This basic motif appears everywhere in Augustine's thought as the very foundation of his whole system. [22] This section (Chs. III and IV) is the most explicit statement of a major motif which pervades the whole of Augustinian metaphysics. We see it in his earliest writings, Soliloquies, 1, 2, and De ordine, II, 7. It is obviously a part of the Neoplatonic heritage which Augustine appropriated for his Christian philosophy. The good is positive, constructive, essential; evil is privative, destructive, parasitic on the good. It has its origin, not in nature, but in the will. Cf. Confessions, Bk. VII, Chs. III, V, XII-XVI; On Continence, 14-16; On the Gospel of John, Tractate XCVIII, 7; City of God, XI, 17; XII, 7-9. [23] Isa. 5:20. [24] Matt. 12:35. [25] This refers to Aristotle's well-known principle of "the excluded middle." [26] Matt. 7:18. [27] Cf. Matt. 12:33. [28] Virgil, Georgios, II, 490. [29] Ibid., 479. [30] Sed in via pedum, non in via morum. [31] Virgil, Eclogue, VIII, 42. The context of the passage is Damon's complaint over his faithless Nyssa; he is here remembering the first time he ever saw her -- when he was twelve! Cf. Theocritus, II, 82. [32] Cf. Matt. 5:37. [33] Cf. Confessions, Bk. X, Ch. XXIII. [34] Ad consentium contra mendacium, CSEL (J. Zycha, ed.), Vol. 41, pp. 469-528; also Migne, PL, 40, c. 517-548; English translation by H.B. Jaffee in Deferrari, St. Augustine: Treatises on Various Subjects (The Fathers of the Church, New York, 1952), pp. 113-179. This had been written about a year earlier than the Enchiridion. Augustine had also written another treatise On Lying much earlier, c. 395; see De mendacio in CSEL (J. Zycha, ed.), Vol. 41, pp. 413-466; Migne, PL, 40, c. 487-518; English translation by M.S. Muldowney in Deferrari, op. cit., pp. 47-109. This summary of his position here represents no change of view whatever on this question. [35] Sallust, The War with Catiline, X, 6-7. [36] Cf. Acts 12:9. [37] Virgil, Aeneid, X, 392. [38] This refers to one of the first of the Cassiciacum dialogues, Contra Academicos. The gist of Augustine's refutation of skepticism is in III, 23ff. Throughout his whole career he continued to maintain this position: that certain knowledge begins with self-knowledge. Cf. Confessions, Bk. V, Ch. X, 19; see also City of God, XI, xxvii. [39] Hab. 2:4; Rom. 1:17. [40] A direct contrast between suspensus assenso -- the watchword of the Academics -- and assensio, the badge of Christian certitude. [41] See above, VII, 90. [42] Matt. 5:37. [43] Matt. 6:12. [44] Rom. 5:12. [45] Cf. Luke 20:36. [46] Rom. 4:17. [47] Wis. 11:20. [48] 2 Peter 2:19. [49] John 8:36. [50] Eph. 2:8. [51] 1 Cor. 7:25. [52] Eph. 2:8, 9. [53] Eph. 2:10. [54] Cf. Gal. 6:15; I1 Cor. 5:17. [55] Ps. 51:10. [56] Phil. 2:13. [57] Rom. 9:16. [58] Prov. 8:35 (LXX). [59] From the days at Cassiciacum till the very end, Augustine toiled with the mystery of the primacy of God's grace and the reality of human freedom. Of two things he was unwaveringly sure, even though they involved him in a paradox and the appearance of confusion. The first is that God's grace is not only primary but also sufficient as the ground and source of human willing. And against the Pelagians and other detractors from grace, he did not hesitate to insist that grace is irresistible and inviolable. Cf. On Grace and Free Will, 99, 41-43; On the Predestination of the Saints, 19:10; On the Gift of Perseverance, 41; On the Soul and Its Origin, 16; and even the Enchiridion, XXIV, 97. But he never drew from this deterministic emphasis the conclusion that man is unfree and everywhere roundly rejects the not illogical corollary of his theonomism, that man's will counts for little or nothing except as passive agent of God's will. He insists on responsibility on man's part in responding to the initiatives of grace. For this emphasis, which is characteristically directed to the faithful themselves, see On the Psalms, LXVIII, 7-8; On the Gospel of John, Tractate, 53:6-8; and even his severest anti-Pelagian tracts: On Grace and Free Will, 6- 8, 10, 31 and On Admonition and Grace, 2-8. [60] Ps. 58:11 (Vulgate). [61] Ps. 23:6. [62] Cf. Matt. 5:44. [63] The theme that he had explored in Confessions, Bks. I-IX. See especially Bk. V, Chs. X, XIII; Bk. VII, Ch. VIII; Bk. IX, Ch. I. [64] Cf. Ps. 90:9. [65] Job 14:1. [66] John 3:36. [67] Eph. 2:3. [68] Rom. 5:9, 10. [69] Rom. 8:14. [70] John 1:14. [71] Rom. 3:20. [72] Epistle CXXXVII, written in 412 in reply to a list of queries sent to Augustine by the proconsul of Africa. [73] John 1:1. [74] Phil. 2:6, 7. [75] These metaphors for contrasting the "two natures" of Jesus Christ were favorite figures of speech in Augustine's Christological thought. Cf. On the Gospel of John, Tractate 78; On the Trinity, I, 7; II, 2; IV, 19-20; VII, 3; New Testament Sermons, 76, 14. [76] Luke 1:28-30. [77] John 1:14. [78] Luke 1:35. [79] Matt. 1:20. [80] Rom. 1:3. [81] Rom. 8:3. [82] Cf. Hos. 4:8. [83] I1 Cor. 5:20, 21. [84] Virgil, Aeneid, II, 1, 20. [85] Num. 21:7 (LXX). [86] Matt. 2:20. [87] Ex. 32:4. [88] Rom. 5:12. [89] Deut. 5:9. [90] Ezek. 18:2. [91] Ps. 51:5. [92] 1 Tim. 2:5. [93] Matt. 3:13. [94] Luke 3:4; Isa. 40:3. [95] Ps. 2:7; Heb. 5:5; cf. Mark 1:9-11. [96] Rom. 5:16. [97] Rom. 5:18. [98] Rom. 6:1. [99] Rom. 5:20. [100] Rom. 6:2. [101] Rom. 6:3. [102] Rom. 6:4-11. [103] Gal. 5:24. [104] Col. 3:1-3. [105] Col. 3:4. [106] John 5:29. [107] Ps. 54:1. [108] Cf. Matt. 25:32, 33. [109] Ps. 43:1. [110] Reading the classical Latin form poscebat (as in Scheel and PL) for the late form poxebat (as in Riviere and many old MSS.). [111] Cf. Ps. 113:3. [112] Here reading unum deum (with Riviere and PL) against deum (in Scheel). [113] A hyperbolic expression referring to "the saints." Augustine's Scriptural backing for such an unusual phrase is Ps. 82:6 and John 10:34f. But note the firm distinction between ex diis quos facit and non factus Deus. [114] 1 Cor. 6:19. [115] 1 Cor. 6:15. [116] Col. 1:18. [117] John 2:19. [118] 2 Peter 2:4 (Old Latin). [119] Heb. 1:13. [120] Ps. 148:2 (LXX). [121] Col. 1:16. [122] Zech. 1:9. [123] Matt. 1:20. [124] Gen. 18:4; 19:2. [125] Gen. 32:24. [126] Rom. 8:31, 32. [127] Cf. Eph. 1:10. [128] Col. 1:19, 20. [129] Cf. 1 Cor. 13:9, 12 [130] Cf. Luke 20:36. [131] 1 Cor. 13:12. [132] Cf. Luke 15:24. [133] Rom. 8:14. [134] 1 John 1:8. [135] In actione poenitentiae; cf. Luther's similar conception of poenitentiam agite in the 95 Theses and in De poenitentia. [136] Ps. 51:17. [137] Ps. 38:9. [138] I1 Cor. 1:22. [139] Ecclus. 40:1 (Vulgate). [140] 1 Cor. 11:31, 32. [141] This chapter supplies an important clue to the date of the Enchiridion and an interesting side light on Augustine's inclination to re-use "good material." In his treatise on The Eight Questions of Dulcitius (De octo Dulcitii quaestionibus), 1: 10-13, Augustine quotes this entire chapter as a part of his answer to the question whether those who sin after baptism are ever delivered from hell. The date of the De octo is 422 or, possibly, 423; thus we have a terminus ad quem for the date of the Enchiridion. Still the best text of De octo is Migne, PL, 40, c. 147-170, and the best English translation is in Deferrari, St. Augustine: Treatises on Various Subjects (The Fathers of the Church, New York, 1952), pp. 427-466. [142] A short treatise, written in 413, in which Augustine seeks to combine the Pauline and Jacobite emphases by analyzing what kind of faith and what kind of works are _both_ essential to salvation. The best text is that of Joseph Zycha in CSEL, Vol. 41, pp. 35-97; but see also Migne, PL, 40, c. 197-230. There is an English translation by C.L. Cornish in A Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church; Seventeen Short Treatises, pp. 37-84. [143] Gal. 5:6. [144] James 2:17. [145] James 2:14. [146] 1 Cor. 3:15. [147] 1 Cor. 6:9, 10. [148] 1 Cor. 3:11, 12. [149] 1 Cor. 3:11-15. [150] Ecclus. 27:5. [151] Cf. 1 Cor. 7:32, 33 [152] See above, XVIII, 67. [153] Matt. 25:34, 41. [154] Ecclus. 15:20. [155] John 3:5. [156] Matt. 6:9-12. [157] Cf. Luke 11 :41. [158] This is a close approximation of the medieval lists of "The Seven Works of Mercy." Cf. J.T. McNeill, A History of the Cure of Souls, pp. 155, 161. (Harper & Brothers, 1951, New York.) [159] Matt. 5:44. [160] John 14:6. [161] Matt. 6:14, 15. [162] Luke 11:37-41. [163] Acts 15:9. [164] Titus 1:15. [165] Ecclus. 30:24 (Vulgate). [166] Rom. 5:16. [167] Rom. 5:8. [168] Luke 10:27. [169] Luke 11:42. [170] Matt. 23:26. [171] Ps. 10:6 (Vulgate). [172] Ps. 58:11 (Vulgate); cf. Ps. 59:10 (R.S.V.). [173] 1 Cor. 7:5 (mixed text). [174] 1 Cor. 6:1. [175] 1 Cor. 6:4-6. [176] 1 Cor. 6:7a. [177] 1 Cor. 6:7b. [178] Matt. 5:40. [179] Luke 6:30. [180] James 3:2 (Vulgate). [181] Matt. 5:22, 23. [182] Gal. 4:11 (Vulgate). [183] Ps. 10:3 (Vulgate). [184] Isa. 5:7 (LXX). [185] Gen. 18:20 (Vulgate with one change). [186] For example, Contra Faust., XXII, 78; De pecc. meritis et remissione, I, xxxix, 70; ibid., II, xxii, 26; Quaest. in Heptateuch, 4:24; De libero arbitrio, 3:18, 55; De div. quaest., 83:26; De natura et gratia, 67:81; Contra duas ep. Pelag., I:3, 7; I:13:27. [187] Ps. 27:1. [188] 2 Tim. 2:25 (mixed text). [189] Cf. Luke 22:61. [190] Cf. John 20:22, 23. [191] This libellus is included in Augustine's Sermons (LXXI, PL, 38, col. 445-467), to which Possidius gave the title De blasphemia in Spiritum Sanctum. English translation in N-PNF, 1st Series, Vol. VI, Sermon XXI, pp. 318-332. [192] Sicut semina quae concepta non fuerint. [193] Jerome, Epistle to Vitalis, Ep. LXXII, 2; PL, 22, 674. Augustine also refers to similar phenomena in The City of God, XVI. viii, 2. [194] Gal. 5:17. [195] 1 Cor. 15:40. [196] 1 Cor. 15:50. [197] 1 Cor. 15:44. [198] Rev. 2:11; 20:6, 14. [199] Ps. 100:1 (Vulgate); cf. Ps. 101:1 (R.S.V.). [200] Matt. 11:21. [201] This is one of the rare instances in which a textual variant in Augustine's text affects a basic issue in the interpretation of his doctrine. All but one of the major old editions, up to and including Migne, here read: Nec utique deus injuste noluit salvos fiere eum possent salvi esse SI VELLENT (if _they_ willed it). This would mean the attribution of a decisive role in human salvation to the human will and would thus stand out in bold relief from his general stress in the rest of the Enchiridion and elsewhere on the primacy and even irresistibility of grace. The Jansenist edition of Augustine, by Arnauld in 1648, read SI VELLET (if _He_ willed it) and the reading became the subject of acrimonious controversy between the Jansenists and the Molinists. The Maurist edition reads si vellet, on the strength of much additional MS. evidence that had not been available up to that time. In modern times, the si vellet reading has come to have the overwhelming support of the critical editors, although Riviere still reads si vellent. Cf. Scheel, 76-77 (See Bibl.); Riviere, 402-403; J.G. Krabinger, S. Aurelii Augustini Enchiridion (Tubingen, 1861 ), p. 116; Faure-Passaglia, S. Aurelii Augustini Enchiridion (Naples, 1847), p. 178; and H. Hurter, Sanctorum Patrum opuscula selecta (Innsbruck, 1895), p. 123. [202] Cf. Ps. 113:11 (a mixed text; composed inexactly from Ps. 115:3 and Ps. 135:6; an interesting instance of Augustine's sense of liberty with the texts of Scripture. Here he is doubtless quoting from memory). [203] 1 Tim. 2:4. [204] Matt. 23:37. [205] Rom. 9:18. [206] Rom. 9:11, 12. [207] Cf. Mal. 1:2, 3 and Rom. 9:13. [208] Rom. 9:14. [209] Rom. 9:15. [210] Rom. 9:15; see above, IX, 32. [211] Eph. 2:3. [212] Rom. 9:16. [213] 1 Cor. 1 :31; cf. Jer. 9:24. The _religious_ intention of Augustine's emphasis upon divine sovereignty and predestination is never so much to account for the doom of the wicked as to underscore the sheer and wonderful gratuity of salvation. [214] Rom. 9:17; cf. Ex. 9:16. [215] Rom. 9:19. [216] Rom. 9:20, 21. [217] 1 Cor. 1:31. [218] Ps. 110:2 (Vulgate). [219] Matt. 16:23. [220] Acts 21:10-12. [221] 1 Tim. 2:4. [222] John 1:9. [223] 1 Tim. 2:1. [224] 1 Tim. 2:2. [225] 1 Tim. 2:3. [226] 1 Tim. 2:4. [227] Luke 11:42. [228] Ps. 135:6. [229] Another example of Augustine's wordplay. Man's original capacities included both the power not to sin and the power to sin (posse non peccare et posse peccare). In Adam's original sin, man lost the posse non peccare (the power not to sin) and retained the posse peccare (the power to sin) -- which he continues to exercise. In the fulfillment of grace, man will have the posse peccare taken away and receive the highest of all, the power not to be able to sin, non posse peccare. Cf. On Correction and Grace XXXIII. [230] Again, a wordplay between posset non mori and non possit mori. [231] Prov. 8:35 (LXX). [232] Rom. 6:23. [233] Cf. John 1:16. [234] Rom. 9:21. [235] 1 Tim. 2:5 (mixed text). [236] Rom. 14:10; I1 Cor. 5:10. [237] Cf. Ps. 77:9. [238] Rom. 9:23. [239] Matt. 25:46. [240] Cf. Ps. 31:19. [241] Note the artificial return to the triadic scheme of the treatise: faith, hope, and love. [242] Jer. 17:5. [243] Matt. 6:9, 10. [244] Matt. 6:11-13. [245] Luke 11:2-4. [246] Matt. 7:7. [247] Another wordplay on cupiditas and caritas. [248] An interesting resemblance here to Freud's description of the Id, the primal core of our unconscious life. [249] Rom. 3:20. [250] 2 Peter 2:19. [251] Rom. 5:20. [252] Compare the psychological notion of the effect of external moral pressures and their power to arouse guilt feelings, as in Freud's notion of "superego." [253] Gal. 5:17. [254] Wis. 11:21 (Vulgate). [255] Cf. John 1:17. [256] John 3:8. [257] Rom. 14:9. [258] Cf. Ps. 88:5. [259] 1 Tim. 1:5. [260] Matt. 22:40. [261] 1 Tim. 1:5. [262] 1 John 4:16. [263] Ex. 20:14; Matt. 5:27; etc. [264] 1 Cor. 7:1. [265] 1 Cor. 4:5. [266] Minuitur autem cupiditas caritate crescente. [267] John 15:23.

and the circle of tall, watchful Utopians about them and

The land is the source or matter from whence all wealth is produced. The labour of man is the form which produces it: and wealth in itself is nothing but the maintenance, conveniencies, and superfluities of life. Land produces herbage, roots, corn, flax, cotton, hemp, shrubs and timber of several kinds, with divers sorts of fruits, bark, and foliage like that of the mulberry-tree for silkworms; it supplies mines and minerals. To all this the labour of man gives the form of wealth. Rivers and seas supply fish for the food of man, and many other things for his enjoyment. But these seas and rivers belong to the adjacent lands or are common to all, and the labour of man extracts from them the fish and other advantages.

Which way soever a society of men is formed the ownership of the land they inhabit will necessarily belong to a small number among them. In wandering societies like Hordes of Tartars and Camps of Indians who go from one place to another with their animals and families, it is necessary that the captain or king who is their leader should fix the boundaries of each head of a family and the quarters of an Individual around the camp. Otherwise there would always be disputes over the quarters or conveniencies, woods, herbage, water, etc. but when the quarters and boundaries of each man are settled it is as good as ownership while they stay in that place. In the more settled societies: if a prince at the head of an army has conquered a country, he will distribute the lands among his officers or favourites according to their merit or his pleasure (as was originally the case in France): he will then establish laws to vest the property in them and their descendants: or he will reserve to himself the ownership of the land and employ his officers or favourites to cultivate it: or will grant the land to them on condition that they pay for it an annual quit rent or due: or he will grant it to them while reserving his freedom to tax them every year according to his needs and their capacity. In all these cases these officers or favourites, whether absolute owners or dependents, whether stewards or bailiffs of the produce of the land, will be few in number in proportion to all the inhabitants. Even if the prince distribute the land equally among all the inhabitants it will ultimately be divided among a small number. One man will have several children and cannot leave to each of them a portion of land equal to his own; another will die without children, and will leave his portion to some one who has land already rather than to one who has none; a third will be lazy, prodigal, or sickly, and be obliged to sell his portion to another who is frugal and industrious, who will continually add to his estate by new purchases and will employ upon it the labour of those who having no land of their own are compelled to offer him their labour in order to live. At the first settlement of Rome each citizen had two journaux of land allotted to him. Yet there was soon after as great an inequality in the estates as that which we see today in all the countries of Europe. The land was divided among a few owners. Supposing then that the land of a new country belongs to a small number of persons, each owner will manage his land himself or let it to one or more farmers: in this case it is essential that the farmers and labourers should have a living whether they cultivate the land for the owner or for the farmer. The overplus of the land is at the disposition of the owner: he pay part of it to the prince or the government, or else the farmer does so directly at the owner's expense. As for the use to which the land should be put, the first necessity is to employ part of it for the maintenance and food of those who work upon it and make it productive: the rest depends principally upon the humour and fashion of living of the prince, the lords, and the owner: if these are fond of drink, vines must be cultivated; if they are fond of silks, mulberry-trees must be planted and silkworms raised, and moreover part of the land must be employed to support those needed for these labours; if they delight in horses, pasture is needed, and so on. If however we suppose that the land belongs to no one in particular, it is not easy to conceive how a society of men can be formed there: we see, for example, in the village commons a limited fixed to the number of animals that each of the commoners may put upon them; and if the land were left to the first occupier in a new conquest or discovery of a country it would always be necessary to fall back upon a law to settle ownership in order to establish a society, whether the law rested upon force or upon policy.

To whatever cultivation land is put, whether pasture, corn, vines, etc. the farmers or labourers who carry on the work must live near at hand; otherwise the time taken in going to their fields and returning to their houses would take up too much of the day. Hence the necessity for villages established in all the country and cultivated land, where there must also be enough farriers and wheelwrights for the instruments, ploughs, and carts which are needed; especially when the village is at a distance from the towns. The size of a village is naturally proportioned in number of inhabitants to what the land dependent on it requires for daily work, and to the artisans who find enough employment there in the service of the farmers and labourers: but these artisans are not quite so necessary in the neighbourhood of towns to which the labourers can resort without much loss of time. If one or more of the owners of the land dependent on the village reside there the number of inhabitants will be greater in proportion to the domestic servants and artisans drawn thither, and the inns which will be established there for the convenience of the domestic servants and workmen who are maintained by the landlords. If the lands are only proper for maintaining sheep, as in the sandy districts and moorlands, the villages will be fewer and smaller since only a few shepherds are required on the land. If the lands only produce woods in sandy soils where there is no grass for beasts, and if they are distant from towns and rivers which makes the timber useless for consumption as one sees in many cases in Germany, there will be only so many houses and villages as are needed to gather acorns and feed pigs in season: but if the lands are altogether barren there will be neither villages nor inhabitants.

There are some villages where markets have been established by the interest of some proprietor or gentleman at court. These markets, held once or twice a week, encourage several little undertakers and merchants to set themselves up there. They buy in the market the products brought from the surrounding villages in order to carry them to the large towns for sale. In the large towns they exchange them for iron, salt, sugar and other merchandise which they sell on market days to the villagers. Many small artisans also, like locksmiths, cabinet makers and others, settle down for the service of the villagers who have none in their villages, and at length these villages become market towns. A market town being placed in the centre of the villages, and at length these villages become market towns. A market town being placed in the centre of the villages whose people come to market, it is more natural and easy that the villagers should bring their products thither for sale on market days and buy the articles they need, than that the merchants and factors should transport them to the villages in exchange for their products. (1) For the merchants to go round the villages would unnecessarily increase the cost of carriage. (2) The merchants would perhaps be obliged to go to several villages before finding the quality and quantity of produce which they wished to buy. (3) The villagers would generally be in their fields when the merchants arrived and not knowing what produce these needed would have nothing prepared and fit for sale. (4) It would be almost impossible to fix the price of the produce and the merchandise in the villages, between the merchants and the villagers. In one village the merchant would refuse the price asked for produce, hoping to find it cheaper in another village, and the villager would refuse the price offered for his merchandise in the hope that another merchant would come along and take it on better terms. All these difficulties are avoided when the villagers come to town on market days to sell their produce and to buy the things they need. Prices are fixed by the proportion between the produce exposed for sale and the money offered for it; this takes place in the same spot, under the eyes of all the villagers of different villages and of the merchants or undertakers of the town. When the price has been settled between a few the others follow without difficulty and so the market place of the day is determined. The peasant goes back to his village and resumes his work. The size of the market town is naturally proportioned to the number of farmers and labourers needed to cultivate the lands dependent on it, and to the number of artisans and small merchants that the villages bordering on the market town employ with their assistants and horses, and finally to the number of persons whom the landowners resident there support. When the villages belonging to a market town (i.e. whose people ordinarily bring their produce to market there) are considerable and have a large output the market town will become considerable and large in proportion; but when the neighbouring villages have little produce the market town also is poor and insignificant.

The landlords who have only small estates usually reside in market towns and villages near their land and farmers. The transport of the produce they derive from them into distant cities would not enable them to live comfortably there. But the landlords who have several large estates have the means to go and live at a distance from them to enjoy agreeable society with other landowners and gentlemen of the same condition. If a prince or nobleman who has received large grants of land on the conquest or discovery of a country fixes his residence in some pleasant spot, and several other noblemen come to live there to be within reach of seeing each other frequently and enjoying agreeable society, this place will become a city. Great houses will be built there for the noblemen in question, and an infinity of others for the merchants, artisans, and people of all sorts of professions whom the residence of these noblemen will attract thither. For the service of these noblemen, bakers, butchers, brewers, wine merchants, manufacturers of all kinds, will be needed. These will build houses in the locality or will rent houses built by others. There is no great nobleman whose expense upon his house, his retinue and servants, does not maintain merchants and artisans of all kinds, as may be seen from the detailed calculations which I have caused to be made in the supplement of this essay. As all these artisans and undertakers serve each other as well as the nobility it is overlooked that the upkeep of them all falls ultimately on the nobles and landowners. It is not perceived that all the little houses in a city such as we have described depend upon and subsist at the expense of the great houses. It will, however, be shown later that all the classes and inhabitants of a state live at the expense of the proprietors of land. The city in question will increase still further if the king or the government establish in it law courts to which the people of the market towns and villages of the province must have recourse. An increase of undertakers and artisans of every sort will be needed for the service of the legal officials and lawyers. If in this same city workshops and manufactories be set up apart from home consumption for export and sale abroad, the city will be large in proportion to the workmen and artisans who live there at the expense of the foreigner. But if we put aside these considerations so as not to complicate our subject, we may say that the assemblage of several rich landowners living together in the same place suffices to form what is called a city, and that many cities in Europe, in the interior of the country, owe the number of their inhabitants to this assemblage: in which case the size of a city is naturally proportioned to the number of landlords who live there, or rather to the produce of the land which belongs to them after deduction of the cost of carriage to those whose land is the furthest removed, and the part which they are obliged to furnish to the king or the government, which is usually consumed in the capital.

(Editor:ability)

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